VII. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question

411. [To the first] - To the first principal argument [n.191] I say that the major is to be understood in this way: ‘all things that are by some identity the same as another, they are by such identity the same thus among themselves’, because an identity of extremes with each other cannot be concluded unless they are according to that identity the same as the middle and the middle is in itself the same in this way; and by this proposition so understood ‘every syllogistic form holds’. For when one or other condition is omitted, whether of the unity of the middle in itself or of the extremes to the middle, there is no syllogism, but the paralogism of the accident.

412. Another response is where the unity of the middle is unlimited with respect to the unity of the extremes. An example of limited where-ness and limited when-ness: things that are together according to ‘where’ or ‘when’ without limitation, either in this way or in that, are nevertheless not the same thus among themselves. Another example, more familiar, is about the intellective soul and about this and that part of flesh [nn.386-387]. - This response succeeds when the same unlimited thing is the ‘with which’ or the ‘in which’, not when it is the ‘this’, unless the requisite unity is lacking to the middle in itself, as the logical response contained here just above says.

413. When it is taken in the minor that ‘whatever is in the divine essence is the same as it’ [n.191], this is not true of formal identity, and therefore the formal identity of the extremes among themselves cannot be inferred; but as long as the formal distinction of the relations of the supposit stands, the distinction of the supposits stands.

414. And if you say that at least from the real identity of them with the essence the identity of them among themselves is inferred, I say that the essence does not have such unique identity of subsistence to the extent the persons or the personal features as extremes are united in the essence, and therefore one cannot infer identity of subsistences or of subsistence by reason of their identity in the essence as in a middle term.

415. From this the response is plain to such sophisms as ‘this God is the Father, the Son is this God, therefore the Son is the Father’, which sophism has a confirmation in that, when ‘this something’ exists as middle term, the extremes must necessarily be conjoined.

My reply. Just as in creatures the common is related as ‘qualified what’, the singular as ‘this something’, so here the essence common to the persons has the idea of ‘qualified what’, and the person has the idea of ‘this something’. The middle term here, then, is ‘qualified what’ and not ‘this someone’. But the identity of the extremes in the conclusion is inferred as if the middle term was ‘this something’; likewise there [in the above sophism] it seems there is a fallacy of the accident and of the consequent, because ‘this God’ is taken in the premises for different supposits, and likewise a fallacy of figure of speech, by change of ‘qualified what’ to ‘this something’.

416. But if you argue ‘the deity is the Father, the Son is deity,     therefore etc     .’, although deity does not stand for any supposit in the major or in the minor, yet there is a figure of speech there, by change of ‘qualified what’ to ‘this someone’. For to make a change like this is nothing other than from the force of the inference to interpret that which has the idea of ‘qualified what’ to have the idea of ‘this someone’; so to infer the supposition about the supposit in this way is to interpret the middle as being the same according to idea of existence or of subsistence, which is false.

417. But if at any rate you argue that ‘the extremes are really the same among themselves because they are the same also in the middle term’, I concede that essential identity can be inferred but not formal identity or identity of supposit. And therefore one should not infer ‘the Son is the Father’, because in this case formal or hypostatic identity is denoted by the form of the words, but one should infer ‘the Son is the same with that which the Father is’ or ‘the Son is that which the Father is’.

418. But if there is still a confirmation of the major of the principal argument [n.191] through the fact that, by denying it, one seems to destroy a first principle, namely by positing affirmation and negation to be true of the same thing, I reply: about something that has true identity, but not so much unique or formal identity, the same thing must, by reason of one ‘reality’, be formally predicated of it and not be formally predicated of the other ‘reality formally’. Just as whiteness by reason of some reality which it has in itself agrees with blackness, and by reason of another reality does not really agree with it but differs, and the affirmation and negation are not said of the same thing by reason of the same thing - namely ‘of reality formally’ -, so here, the Father by reason of essence is the same quidditatively, and by reason of property is not the same formally or hypostatically, and the affirmation and negation are not said of the same identity about the same thing nor by reason of the same thing; and although the affirmation and negation be said of the same identity about the same thing, not however by reason of the same thing, to wit if it were said that by reason of paternity the Father is not the same quidditatively with the Son but by reason of essence.

419. If on the contrary you say that affirmation differs from affirmation where the negation of one is said about something else or stands with something else, because the other is not true of the affirmation which contradicts the negation, therefore if deity stands with non-paternity (to wit in some other person), deity itself would differ from paternity, which never stands along with non-paternity in the same thing, I reply: the major may be conceded of formal, or not adequate, non-identity, because one of them is not determined to the other, wherefore it stands with the opposite of the other, - or in other words the major may be conceded of convertible and precise non-identity. But if the major takes real distinction simply, it is to be denied; the thing is plain in whiteness; by taking the proper reality from which the genus is taken, with that reality the opposite of the difference of blackness is not of itself repugnant; yet with the reality from which is taken the specific difference of whiteness, the difference of blackness is repugnant.

420. And this response should be understood as to the second part of the major, which says that one or other affirmation ‘stands’ with the negation. But as to the first part of the major, which takes the negation ‘to be said’ of the affirmation, the major could, as to that part, be conceded if ‘to be said’ is understood ‘necessarily and universally and through the proper reason of that of which it is said’, and this when the contradiction which the words concern is real or is of thing to non-thing, but not of reason to nonreason, for then there only follows a distinction of reason of affirmation from affirmation.

421. By applying the first part of the major - in the way it is true - to the proposed case, it follows that the Son is really distinguished from the Father, but not that God or deity is, because not-Father is not said of God necessarily and universally, nor by reason of the subject, although according to some [Henry of Ghent] it be said particularly by reason of the supposit of the subject.

422. But if you argue, let that by which the Father is distinguished from the Son be a, then a, insofar as it is a, is either the same as the essence or different - if it is different, this is discordant; if insofar as a is the same, then, insofar as it distinguishes, it is the same as the essence, and consequently the essence distinguishes - I reply: I say that it is neither true that a insofar as it is a is the same as the essence nor that a insofar as it is a is different from the essence, and this by understanding that which follows the reduplication to be taken according to its formal reason, and that along with this it has to be the formal reason for the inherence of the predicate, just as I distinguished above in the case of unity of enjoyable object in response to the third argument [I d.1 n.58]. There is an example for this: for man and non-man are immediate opposites, and yet neither is said formally about anything along with reduplication; just as a white thing is not man insofar as it is white nor is it non-man insofar as it is white.

423. And if you say ‘the same’ and ‘other’ are immediate opposites in the case of being, I say that it does not follow “they are immediate opposites, therefore one or other is said of anything along with ‘insofar as’” such that the idea of the subject is the formal reason for the inherence of the other contradictory, but it suffices that one or other of the contradictories truly exists in any subject, although not per se by reason of the subject. But if the ‘insofar as’ is taken in the first way, so that it only indicates that the a is taken according to its formal reason [n.422], I say that a, when in any way formally taken, is the same as the essence, although it is not formally the same as the essence; but in that case this inference does not follow “‘a formally’ is the same as the essence, ‘a formally’ distinguishes, therefore the essence distinguishes,” but there is a figure of speech, by change of ‘this someone’ to ‘qualified what’.

424. If still you insist that a insofar as it is a is a being or a thing, so which thing or which being? - if the essence then the proposition [n.191] is obtained, if a thing and not the essence, then some other thing - I reply: I concede that it is a being and a thing, and this by taking ‘insofar as’ in both ways, because if some predicate per se in the first mode is present in something, then it will be present in the same mode per se whether the subject is a thing distinct from whatever is outside the idea of it or is contained by identity in something which is outside the idea of it; for such containing does not take away the formal reason nor what is present per se in the first mode.

425. But when you ask, which being? [n.424], - I say the being which a is; just as if a substance is a per se being, that being, by descending under being, is per se substance, and not anything else. If you ask further whether it is per se essence, it has been said [n.423] that it is not. If you infer ‘therefore it is another per se thing’, it is the fallacy of the consequent to say ‘it is not per se this thing, and it is a thing, therefore it is another thing’ [n.424], because in the antecedent ‘per se identity’ is denied, in the consequent ‘identity’, and so the antecedent is destroyed.Text cancelled by Scotus: “Augustine in the same place: ‘Now substance will not be substance, because it will be relative’; and there follows: ‘It is absurd for substance to be said relatively’ (deduce: ‘therefore the converse is absurd’).” ²²²

426. Suppose you object: ‘it is per se a thing, and it is not per se essence’, ‘therefore it is per se another thing’, and further, ‘therefore it is another thing’.

427. The proof of the first consequence is that in the case of a being ‘same’ and ‘different’ are immediate opposites; therefore if it is per se a thing, it is per se the same thing as the essence (and so it is per se essence), or it is per se some other thing. The proof of the second consequence is that ‘per se’ is not a determination that divides, as is plain.

428. Further, the first consequence is proved, and it is to the principal point, because if it is per se a thing, it is either a thing which is the essence or a thing which is not the essence. If it is per se a thing which is the essence, therefore it is per se the essence; if it is per se a thing which is not the essence, then it is a thing other than the essence.

429. Further, third: essence is per se a thing, and a property is per se a thing, and they are not per se the same thing; therefore they are per se two things, and so each is per se a different thing from the other.

430. To the first [n.426]. Although the conclusion of the first argument could be distinguished, because there would be there a difference of per se-ity or a per se-ity of difference, and in the first way the ‘per se’ would be denied by the negation included in the difference, in the second way it would be affirmed, because it would precede the way of negation, and consequently in the first way the consequent of the first consequence would be conceded - but then the second consequence would offend according to the consequent by destroying the antecedent [n.425], in the second way the first consequence would offend according to the consequent - however, because it does not seem logically well said that negation, if it is in any way included in the difference, could attain something other than the term of the respect and than the form in which, or according to which, the difference is noted to exist, nor does it seem logically well said that the ‘per se’, which indicates the mode of inherence and consequently determines the composite, could be denied by some denial in the predicate, therefore one should say in another way that, in the consequent of the first consequence, there can be obtained, by force of the words, only one sense, namely that this predicate, to be a thing other than the essence, is ‘per se’ present in the property; and this sense is false, because thus the false thing that is inferred in the second consequence very well follows. Therefore I simply deny the first consequence, since the two propositions in the antecedent are true and the consequent false.

431. To the proof of the consequence [n.427] I say that ‘same’ and ‘diverse’ are not immediate about any predicate as said per se of a subject, nay rather contradictories are not thus immediate; for man is not per se white nor per se not-white. Yet between contradictories absolutely taken or absolutely said of something, there is no middle; so if a property is a thing, it is true it is the ‘same’ or ‘other’, but with a ‘per se’ it is not valid that it be ‘per se the same’ or ‘per se other’.

432. To the second [n.428]. The antecedent can be distinguished according to composition and division. In sense of composition neither [part of the antecedent] is to be granted; for just as one must not grant that it is per se essence or per se non-essence [n.431], so neither must one grant the other member of this disjunctive, with ‘which is’, in sense of composition. Nor are by this both contradictories denied, because if you are speaking of the terms, it is given that neither of them is said per se of the subject; this I concede. If you wish to hold to the contradictory propositions, I say that they will be these: ‘either the property is per se a thing which is essence, or it is not per se a thing which is essence’; and the negative here is true, but it does not entail ‘therefore it is per se a thing which is not essence’, just as it does not follow ‘a man is not per se white’, ‘therefore he is per se non-white’. - In sense of division the affirmative part of the disjunctive must be granted; but it does not further follow ‘therefore it is per se essence’, because formal identity is being inferred from real identity, for the antecedent in sense of division only indicates real identity by the ‘which is’.

433. In another way could the aforesaid antecedent [n.432] be distinguished, so that by the implication ‘which is’ be understood formal inherence or only identical inherence. In the first way neither part is to be granted, because neither of the opposites is per se in the thing which is said per se of the property. In the second way the affirmative part is to be granted, but the intended proposition [n.191] does not in addition follow, because of the positing of the consequent [n.428].

434. This second distinction [n.433] does not hold by force of the words, because the implicated composite [‘which is’] is not determined to something which indicates that it means formal inherence, but only identical inherence; the first distinction [n.432] does hold by force of the words, and although ‘which is’ there does not indicate formal inherence in sense of composition, yet from the unity of the extreme, as it is a quasi specific or determinative construction, the essence has to be denominated ‘per se present in’ the subject.Note cancelled by Scotus: “Let here be introduced the saying of the doctor [Augustine] about double predication in divine reality, namely by identity and formally, which he well explains in this one way...” ²²³

435. [To the second] - To the second [n.192] I say that what is accidental is either taken for something extraneous or is taken properly, for that which as it were perfects something accidentally which in itself pre-exists as perfect. If in the second way, I say that not every being is essential or accidental to every being that it is in; for there is a middle between the accidental and the essential, as in the case of that which contracts, as difference contracts a genus, because such a thing is neither substantial nor accidental, taking it in this way. And thus in divine reality nothing is accidental, but there is beside the essence something non-essential. - But if the accidental is taken in the first way, anything that is not of the formal idea of it but extraneous, although it not properly be called accidental, would thus be an accidental difference with respect to the genus; and in this way the Philosopher takes the accidental for the extraneous in the fallacy of the accident [Sophistical Refutations 1.5.166b28-30]. Thus can anything be called accidental to something which is extraneous to it as it is compared to some third predicate.

436. [To the third] - To the third [n.193] I say that if in the major by the ‘if’ is understood a possible condition, the major is true and the minor false; for, when a possible is posited, by no positing can the second person in divine reality be lacking without the supreme good and supreme perfection being lacking. And if you prove that, if the second person were lacking, supreme perfection would exist in the Father, I say that if that person were lacking, supreme perfection would be lacking; and if the second person were lacking and the Father was not lacking, supreme perfection would be present; and so for supreme perfection to be lacking and for the Father to be present includes a contradiction. - But if in the major by the ‘if is posited an incompossible positing, I say that the major is false; for in the supreme good must be posited that which cannot be posited not to be without the positing of incompossibles.

437. [To the fourth] - To the final one [n.195] I say that the reason about ‘necessary being’ must be thus understood: whatever is of itself a necessary being has of itself the most actual existence, such that it does not by anything - in any way other than itself - expect any actuality of existing. And therefore it is of itself indivisible, because if it could be divided, then from the things by which it might be divided it would expect some actuality of existing that it would have in the divided parts; and then it would be necessary that the things distinguishing that necessary being would formally be necessities of existing, because they would be ultimate actualities of necessity in those diverse necessary beings, without which they would not have the most actual being, because the divisible does not have the most actual being or the most actual existence. On this basis, then, the reason holds that was above posited [n.177] in the question about the unity of God, from the reason about ‘necessary being’, which was also touched on in the first question of the second distinction [n.71], that necessary being is not divided among several things. Because if a and b were not formally necessities of existing, even before they were understood in any of the things among which necessary being is divided, then, since they are ultimate actualities without which that common actuality would not exist, that common actuality would not be necessary being, because it would in some way require something other than itself by which it would be. But this does not hold of diverse persons in the same necessary entity; for that entity, which is of itself necessary, does not expect any actuality from the things that distinguish the persons, because it is not divided by the things that distinguish the persons, and the things that distinguish the persons are not as it were ultimate actualities by which such beings exist.

438. When therefore it is argued ‘a and b (understanding by these here two personal properties) are either formally necessities of existing or they are not’ [n.195], one can concede that they are not formally necessities of existing; and it does not follow ‘therefore they are possibilities’, because they are by identity that one necessity of existence. But if a and b were in diverse things, one would have to say that they were formally necessities or possible entities, because they could not be the same as some entity that was of itself necessary; for that common entity, to which they were the same, would be as it were a potential for existing, in the way this common entity is understood before the idea that contracts or divides it.

439. Against this [nn.438, 437]: being able to be lacking is either repugnant to the a, insofar as it is a, or is not repugnant. If it is, a insofar as it is a is necessary, and so it is the reason for necessarily existing for that for which it is the form. If not, then by nothing can something else be repugnant to a precisely insofar as it is a, therefore by nothing is there taken away from a, precisely insofar as it is a, its being able ‘to be lacking’; therefore, as precisely taken, it is always ‘able to be lacking’;     therefore it is repugnant to ‘necessarily of itself’. - To this...The point seems to be that the argument is of this form: ‘if it is not per se this thing, then it is some other thing; but it is a thing; therefore it is some other thing’, which amounts to denying (‘destroying’) the antecedent, and asserting the consequent, which move is fallacious. ²²⁴